CONCILIUM

CONCILIUM/VOL. 31

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THE SACRAMENTS IN GENERAL

A NEW PERSPECTIVE

edited by EDWARD SCHILLEBEECKX, O.P.
BONIFACE WILLEMS, O.P.

VOLUME 31

CONCILIUM
theology in the age of renewal

PAULIST PRESS
NEW YORK, N.Y. / GLEN ROCK, N.J.

NIHIL OBSTAT: John E. Brooks, S.J., S.T.D.
Censor Deputatus

IMPRIMATUR: ✠ Bernard J. Flanagan, D.D.
Bishop of Worcester

December 27, 1967

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Library of Congress Catalogue Card Number: 68-20451

Suggested Decimal Classification: 232

Paulist Press assumes responsibility for the accuracy of the English translations in this Volume.

PAULIST PRESS
EXECUTIVE OFFICES: 304 W. 58th Street, New York, N.Y. and 21 Harristown Road, Glen Rock, N.J.
Executive Publisher: John A. Carr, C.S.P.
Executive Manager: Alvin A. Illig, C.S.P.
Asst. Executive Manager: Thomas E. Comber, C.S.P.

EDITORIAL OFFICES: 304 W. 58th Street, New York, N.Y.
Editor: Kevin A. Lynch, C.S.P.
Managing Editor: Urban P. Intondi

Printed and bound in the United States of America by
The Colonial Press Inc., Clinton, Mass.

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PREFACE

Edward Schillebeeckx, O.P./*Nijmegen, Netherlands*
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The impact of technology and science is still on the increase. Man continues to strengthen and broaden his grip on the world. In this he fulfills an essential part of the mission for which he was created: to make the earth more inhabitable. Among others, Paul Ricoeur pointed out that at the same time man should develop his insight in the world as a mystery. Without this, reality might be reduced to what can be manipulated and precisely verified.

One of the ways in which theology can help to keep sight of this "mystery" character of reality is the study of sacramentality. In the *Constitution on the Church* Vatican Council II showed that the word "sacrament", like the word "mystery", has a meaning that stretches beyond the seven sacraments as we know them. The word refers to a transcendent reality, invisible in itself, but manifested in ways that belong to this earth. This fact has rarely been brought out with sufficient clarity in the traditional treatises of dogmatic theology. Yet, this could well be done in the treatment of "the sacraments in general", but unfortunately this treatise became in most textbooks an *a priori* construction that laid down general conditions which the seven sacraments had to satisfy. This procedure, moreover, created the impression that the known seven sacraments were all "sacrament" in exactly the same sense, were equally important and knew of no historical development.

This present volume of *Concilium* tries, therefore, to put the traditional subject of "the sacraments in general" into a new light. It does not deal with the specifically ecumenical aspects as this was done in Concilium, Vol. 24. The first two articles already show that both the scriptures (van Iersel) and tradition (Congar) know of a certain hierarchy among the seven sacraments. Baptism and the eucharist are rightly called the "principal sacraments". The human sciences lead to the same conclusion. It is most important from the pastoral point of view that theology and preaching bear in mind the anthropological substructure of the sacraments (Bro). As the de-sacralization of the world increases, the meaning of Church and sacrament becomes more and more problematical in a secularized world (Groot). Once we have grasped the broader meaning of the sacraments, the question arises as to what exactly is meant by the Tridentine definition that there are but seven sacraments. Both Scripture and comparison with other religions and cultures show that the point here is not the number as quantity but rather the number "seven" as a symbol of plenitude (Dournes). Another reason to interpret the number seven theologically and not arithmetically lies in the general priesthood of the faithful. When studied properly this appears to be a genuine sacramental priesthood, while the official priesthood is meant to ensure that the People of God as a whole can exercise its priesthood (Semmelroth). The last article shows the connection between the sacrament as an outward sign and what has been traditionally understood by "character" (Ruffini).

The first bibliographical contribution surveys recent literature about the intention of the minister and the recipient of the sacrament, a subject of outstanding pastoral importance (Tillard). The second bibliographical survey shows that a renewed theology of the sacraments can also have ecumenical consequences for the right appreciation of Anglican orders (Hughes). The documentation section, edited by the Secretariat, contains an historical study of the connection between the collegiality of the bishops and the exercise of episcopal authority (d'Ercole).

PART I
ARTICLES

Bastiaan van Iersel, S.M.M./*Nijmegen, Netherlands*

Some Biblical Roots of the Christian Sacrament

I take for granted that the student of the New Testament will be allowed not to start his search for the biblical roots of the sacrament[1] with classical or current notions in order to test these notions by comparing them with scriptural evidence; nor will he be satisfied with an analysis of scriptural texts, dealing with the sacraments in order to judge opinions that are prevalent today. He is rather concerned with concepts or facts which are presupposed in the relevant texts of the New Testament and which may shed a new light on the understanding of the sacraments.

This is not so simple, since Scripture does not speak about sacraments in general. It only mentions concrete human actions which became a fixed rite and were experienced as bringing about salvation. Moreover, only a few of such actions clearly became fixed rites within the scope of the New Testament. This New Testament often mentions the imposition of hands, it speaks of sins being forgiven and the sick being anointed, but in such a way that there we do not have a clearly fixed rite that works salvation. And so the student is limited to a few actions only, baptism and the celebration of the eucharist. And these are only brought together once, namely, in 1 Corinthians 10, 1f., and even then in

[1] Cf. P. Neuenzeit, "Biblische Ansätze zum urchristlichen Sakramentsverständnis," in H. Fries, *Wort und Sakrament* (Munich, 1966), pp. 88–96.

a roundabout way. Nowhere are baptism and eucharist dealt with *qua* sacraments.

This seems to limit the possibilities while at the same time it seems to indicate the only way of saying something significant about the roots on the basis of these data. We shall have to start from what is actually being said there about baptism or eucharist. In order to do this it is not enough to deal with what is presupposed for only one of these two. To make sufficiently sure that such presuppositions play their part in baptism and eucharist as sacraments, they must be seen to be operative in both. The best thing, then, is to select some data from the Old Testament which are evidently relevant in one of these two cases and then to see whether, and how far, they also apply to the other.

It seems to me that this can be shown in the case of two of these presuppositions. I shall try to trace two lines from this Old Testament evidence to baptism and the eucharist.

I

The first of these two lines is based on "anamnesis", or remembrance. This is a line which is commonly used to throw light upon the eucharist. If this is possible it may be possible to show that this theme has some relevance for sacramentalism as such.

Something similar can be said of the concept expressed in the term "corporative person". That this notion is important already has been recognized for a long time with regard to baptism. But, as far as I know, this has hardly been developed with regard to the eucharist.

The starting point is therefore extremely simple. In each of these two cases we have a datum that is clearly relevant for one sacrament and which we then pursue to see whether it is relevant for the other. This would seem to justify the conclusion that these two presuppositions may have something to contribute to the understanding of sacramentalism as such. And this gives us the

plan of this article. The next part will therefore deal with "remembrance" and the third with the "corporative person".

It ought to be obvious that these two aspects do not represent all the scriptural roots of sacramentalism. Other starting points have played an important part in the later development of the Church's teaching on the sacraments. But even the relevant passages of the New Testament have naturally a far broader foundation in Scripture, but this is of a much more general nature. One might here think of a number of basic scriptural ideas such as that every man needs deliverance and communication, that he cannot find these, at the deepest level, in himself but only in God; that, on the other hand, God's deliverance always operates through what man does in this world, and so on. It would also be an illusion to think that what follows is a complete treatment of the foundation of the sacrament as it has been given concrete shape in baptism and eucharist. The epithet "some" of the title of this article was not put there without reason.

II

While it is not immediately obvious that "remembrance" or anamnesis is relevant to the sacrament as such, it is clear that in various New Testament texts, such as 1 Corinthians 11, 24–5 and Luke 22, 19–20 ("Do this in remembrance of me"), the celebration of the eucharist is characterized as a celebration of remembrance.

This word remembrance (Gr. *anamnêsis*) calls to mind a whole complex of associated concepts in the Old Testament, linked with verbal forms and nouns that are derived from the Hebrew root *zkr*. To see the connection of these associated ideas with Christian baptism, we have to look into this association complex. This is made easy through the remarkably large number of recent publications on this subject.[2]

[2] N. A. Dahl, "Anamnesis," in *Studia Theologica* 1 (1948), pp. 69–95; W. Marxsen, "Repräsentation im Abendmahl?" in *Monatschr. f. Pastoraltheologie* 41 (1952), pp. 69–78; M. Noth, "Die Vergegenwärtigung des

The basic meaning of the root *zkr* is usually given as "to remember", "to commemorate", "to call to mind", "to remind". It is then usually pointed out that the words derived from this root have a meaning that is considerably broader than that of our translations. Particularly, "to remember" must not be understood as that introvert process by which we recall a past event or person without any commitment on our side to such an event or person. It is true that in Hebrew, too, the word indicates that we bridge a certain distance in time or space. But there "to remember" is never limited to a casting back of one's mind to something of the past or an absent person, still less to a losing of oneself in that past or that distant place.

The distance in time or space indeed plays a part, but it is not bridged in a purely mental fashion. It is rather bridged in actual reality through things that are happening here and now. If the Hebrew "remembers", it means that the past is brought up to the present, and as such provides the impulse *to do* something *now*. Let us deliberately take a situation that has nothing to do with "religion", to show that this use of *zkr* is part of the ordinary language of everyday.

It is taken from Genesis 40 where we are told what happened to Joseph in the Egyptian prison. When Joseph has explained the dreams of the chief baker and the chief butler and has told the latter that he will be restored to office within a few days, he says: "But remember me when it is well with you, and do me the kindness, I pray you, to make mention of me to Pharaoh, and so get me out of this house" (Gen. 40, 14). The narrative, however, concludes with the laconic information: "Yet the chief butler did not remember Joseph, but forgot him" (40, 23). This illustration

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Alten Testaments in der Verkündigung," in *Evang. Theol.* 12 (1952–3), pp. 6–17; C. L. Kessler, *The Memory Motif in the God-Man Relationship of the Old Testament* (Evanston, 1956); H. Gross, "Zur Wurzel *skr*," in *Bibl. Zeitschr.* 4 (1960), pp. 227–37); P.A.H. De Boer, *Gedenken und Gedächtnis in der Welt des Alten Testaments* (Franz Delitzsch-Vorlesungen 1960, Stuttgart, 1962); B. S. Childs, *Memory and Tradition in Israel* (Studies in Biblical Theology 37, London, 1962); W. Schottroff, *'Gedenken' im alten Orient und im alten Testament* (Wiss. Monogr. zum Alten und Neuen Testament 15, Neukirchen-Vluyn, 1964, lit.).

shows that "to remember" and "not to remember" imply far more than a mere mental recalling of Joseph, and that the butler's forgetfulness is not a mere matter of memory. "To remember" is an outgoing activity as is clear from the parallelism of verse 14. It has obviously a link with the past, being imprisoned together and the good turn which Joseph did to the butler, but it is really concerned with what has to be done now, in the present. The link with the past lies in that the past is the actual stimulus to do something in the present. This means that "remembrance" is not a matter of uncommitted detachment but rather places the past in the present in order to bring about some action. That the meaning here set out is not dependent on this particular context but lies in the word itself is clear from other texts where it is used (e.g., 1 Sam. 25, 30–1. 39–40; Est. 2, 1).

In a certain sense this is the opposite of what we usually mean by "remembering" or "commemorating". One does not transport oneself into the past but rather places the past in the present where its effect becomes operative.

This plays also an important part when a derivation of the root *zkr* is used in a religious context. The religious use links up with the non-religious use in those texts where men "remember" something. For this, one can point to a fair number of texts in Deuteronomy where Israel is called upon to "remember" God's saving deeds as these had become a reality in Israel's deliverance from Egypt. Usually only one concrete moment is mentioned explicitly, and the slavery condition in Egypt occurs most frequently: "You shall remember that you were a servant in the land of Egypt, and the Lord your God brought you out thence with a mighty hand and an outstretched arm" (Deut. 5, 15; cf. 15, 15; 16, 12; 24, 18 and 22; other instances are mentioned in 7, 18; 8, 2; 9, 7; 16, 3; 24, 9; 25, 17). But this "remembering" is again not a mere looking back toward the past, but rather at what Yahweh has done for Israel. This past is always called forth in view of "therefore you shall . . .". Remembering is therefore always the basis for keeping the law, the purpose of Deuteronomy. Such remembrance is therefore no turning away from the present. On the contrary, it

brings the past as close as possible so that it becomes a starting point in the present. God's saving deeds are recalled for their relevance to the present, because of the consequences implied for Israel's present conduct. The same holds for the exhortation to "remember" the law which Yahweh gave to Moses (Num. 15, 38–40; Jos. 1, 13–5; Mal. 3, 22).

The opposite, "not remembering" God or God's saving deeds, is in fact identical with apostasy (Jg. 8, 33–5; Is. 17, 9–11). Even when God is subject of a form of the verb derived from *zkr*, it is never a matter of something within God himself but always of some actual happening in which the believer recognizes God. This is the case, for instance, when God is asked or said to remember Noah (Gen. 8, 1), Abraham (Gen. 19, 29), Samson (Jg. 16, 28), Hezekiah (2 Kgs. 20, 3; Is. 38, 3); Jeremiah (Jer. 15, 15; 18, 20), David (Ps. 132, 1), or the whole of Israel (Jer. 2, 2; Ps. 74, 2; 115, 12). How much an actual happening is concerned here, which the believer attributes to Yahweh "remembering" somebody, is very clear, for instance in 1 Samuel 1, 11, where Hannah is made to pray as follows: "O Lord of hosts, if thou wilt indeed look on the affliction of thy maidservant, and remember me, and not forget thy maidservant, but wilt give to thy maidservant a son, then I will give him to the Lord all the days of his life."

The granting of this prayer is described in these terms: "And Elkanah knew Hannah his wife, and the Lord remembered her; and in due time Hannah conceived" (vv. 19–20; cf. Gen. 30, 22). When Yahweh is asked to "remember" Israel (Pss. 89, 51; 136, 23; Lam. 3, 19–20; 5, 1) the intention is clear. The Israelites are not concerned with Yahweh merely thinking about them but rather with the idea that Yahweh will work salvation anew. This is still clearer when in this connection the expression is used of "remembering the covenant", an expression that is probably taken straight from ordinary secular speech (see Amos 1, 9), and used with regard to Yahweh especially when Israel is threatened with destruction (Gen. 9, 14–6; Ex. 2, 24–5; 6, 5; Lev. 26, 44–5; Pss. 106, 44–5; 105, 8 = Chron. 16, 15; 111, 4; Jer.

14, 19–22; Ezek. 16, 59–60). The new reference to the covenant, which is added to the "remembrance" has its importance. For it expresses Israel's belief in the continuity of Yahweh's saving activity, a belief that is based on the enduring validity of the covenant and the unceasing power of his promises (Ex. 32, 13; Pss. 119, 49; 105, 37–43; Neh. 1, 7–10), which embody his grace and faithfulness (Pss. 25, 6; 98, 2–3; Hab. 3, 2).

When *zkr* is used with God as subject in connection with Israel's sinfulness, it is equally clear how effective and actual this "remembrance" is (Is. 43, 25; 64, 8; Jer. 14, 10; 31, 34; Hos. 7, 2; 8, 13; 9, 9; Pss. 25, 7; 79, 5 and 8–9). A good illustration of this is Hosea 8, 13: "They love sacrifice; they sacrifice flesh and eat it; but the Lord has no delight in them. Now he will remember their iniquity, and punish their sins; they shall return to Egypt." To "remember" sins is identical with punishing them, while "not remembering" is not merely forgetting but forgiving: "I, I am he who blots out your transgressions for my own sake, and I will not remember your sins" (Is. 43, 25).

The texts we have discussed leave us in no doubt: to "remember" something or somebody who is absent in time or space does not mean a turning away from one's own present reality but, on the contrary, doing something here and now, bringing the past to the present in order to bring about a present action. This linguistic use of "remembrance" is important for its connection with our cult for more than one reason. Let us look, by way of contrast, first at Psalm 78, 34–7: "When he slew them, they sought for him; they repented and sought God earnestly. They remembered that God was their rock, the Most High God their redeemer. But they flattered him with their mouths; they lied to him with their tongues. Their heart was not steadfast toward him; they were not true to his covenant." In contrast with what was said above, we have here a "remembering" that does not lead to any consequences. It is more than a mere mental calling to mind because the context makes it plain that "remembering" is not merely a matter of the heart but also of words. The point is that it is left merely to the words, and the heart has no part in it. In

fact, the words referred to here are those pronounced in the religious celebration as a confession of the fact that Yahweh is Israel's "rock". The word *zakar* obviously refers to a liturgical remembrance.

All this fits in with the way in which Israel's memorial days are spoken about. The feast of the Pasch is a "memorial day" when Israel "commemorates" ritually what Yahweh did for Israel at the deliverance from their slavery in Egypt (Ex. 12, 1–20). But here, too, this "remembering" in ritual actions and narratives (Deut. 6, 20–5; 16, 1–8) is much more than a mere looking back to the past. What is commemorated becomes in some real way present in the commemoration, and in such a real way that we can read on this point in the Mishna (Pesach 10, 5): "In every generation we must see ourselves as having gone out of Egypt . . . ; therefore we must thank him and praise him who led our fathers and us through these wonderful things out of slavery into freedom." Every new generation of Israelites can say again: "When the Egyptians mistreated and oppressed *us* . . . we called on Yahweh, the God of our fathers. Yahweh heard *us* . . . and led *us* out of Egypt . . ." (Deut. 26, 6–8; cf. 6, 20–5). In the celebration of the Pasch, God's saving action becomes actual in word and rite each year, so that everyone who takes part in the celebration also takes part in the deliverance and redemption. In an almost equally realistic way Israel commemorates the Feast of Tabernacles when Yahweh made "Israel dwell in tents at the exodus from Egypt" (Lev. 23, 33–43), and the annual celebration of the Purim keeps alive the memory of the salvation experienced in the diaspora where persecution turned into deliverance (Esther 9, 19–28).

In this connection we must also refer to the septennial reading of the law at the Feast of Tabernacles (Deut. 31, 10–13), where the law of Deuteronomy (Deut. 12–26) is taken as the reading. Whether this implies a ritual actualization of the event on Mount Sinai, may be left open here. But it is certainly not accidental that in Deuteronomy, where the word "remember" occurs so frequently (5, 15; 7, 18; 8, 2–18; 9, 7; 15, 15; 16, 3–12; 24, 9, 18,

22; 25, 17; 32, 7), the Israel of later centuries is addressed as if it stood itself at the foot of the mountain.

M. Noth sees a striking indication of this actualization in Deuteronomy 5, 3: "Not with our fathers did the Lord make this covenant, but with us, who are all of us here alive this day." [3] He suggests that the constant repetition of "here" and "today" refers to those to whom the code is being read out; nor can it be merely accidental that this "today" occurs so often and in such important places in Deuteronomy (e.g., 26, 16–19). The reading makes the proclamation of the law present again. Here, too, "remembering" is more a "calling forth" of the past than just looking back on it.

One more point must be made. There is a close connection between "remembrance" and the name, particularly the name of Yahweh, as P. A. H. De Boer has pointed out.[4] This is clear, for instance, from the fact that the causative form of *zakar, hizkir,* very often has *sjem,* the name, as its object, and that the noun, *zeker,* is often parallel with *sjem,* so that it can be seen as synonymous and can therefore be translated by "name". Whether this justifies De Boer to conclude that the root meaning of *zkr* is to "name", to "call", to "call forth", and that to "recall", to "remember", to "commemorate" is the secondary meaning is another matter. But that Yahweh's saving deeds are recalled by calling upon his name, especially in ritual worship, is beyond all doubt.

In turning to the texts that refer to baptism and the eucharist, there is no need for me to repeat what has already been said by so many about the eucharist as remembrance[5] or about the precise meaning of the words: "Do this in remembrance of me" in 1 Corinthians 11, 24–5 and Luke 22, 19.[6] I only want to make one

[3] *Op. cit.,* p. 11.

[4] *Op. cit.*

[5] E.g. M. Thurian, *L'Eucharistie, mémorial du Seigneur* (Neuchâtel, 1959).

[6] Cf. J. Jeremias, *Die Abendmahlsworte Jesu* (Gottingen, 3, 1960), pp. 229–46; W. C. Van Unnik, "Kanttekeningen bij een nieuwe verklaring van de anamnese woorden," in *Nederlands Theol. Tijdschr.* 4 (1949–50), pp. 369–77; H. Kosmala, "Das tut zu meinem Gedächtnis," in *Novum Testamentum* 4 (1960), pp. 81–94.

observation. In view of what has been said before, it is important to note the words added in 1 Corinthians 11, 26 to this command of the Lord: "For as often as you eat this bread and drink the cup, you proclaim the Lord's death until he comes." In these words Paul implies among other things that the commemoration is a re-presentation of Jesus' death on the cross, not only in the ritual meal but also in the proclamation accompanying this rite. This is precisely what distinguishes the Lord's Supper from an ordinary meal. What is called forth in this "remembrance" is the death of the Lord, i.e. the redemption by God in the Lord Jesus, in which the partakers of the meal share.

But how does this apply to baptism? As far as I know it has not been pointed out that the baptismal texts, too, contain elements that show this same association of ideas that are linked with the root *zkr*. Two points need mentioning here. In the first place, the standard formula "to baptize in the name of . . ." which is explicitly mentioned in Matthew 28, 19; Acts 2, 38; 8, 16; 10, 48 and 19, 5, is definitely presupposed in 1 Corinthians 1, 13 and 15; 6, 11 and 10, 2, and is also probably implied in Romans 6, 3 and Galatians 3, 27. What does this formula mean? In any case that the baptized person belongs henceforth to him in whose name he is baptized. But it also says something about the manner in which this takes place, namely, through the pronouncing of the name (of Jesus Christ or the Father, Son and Holy Spirit) over him. This pronouncing of the name over the baptized person is connected with "remembering". For this pronouncing is much more than a juridical or quasi-juridical action by which the baptized person is as it were formally made over and becomes the "property" of Christ. It rather calls forth that actual happening of salvation in Christ, makes present again what God has done through Jesus and saves the baptized person by bringing him out of death and darkness into the light of Christ (Eph. 5, 14; cf. vv. 8 and 11; Col. 1, 12–3; 1 Peter 2, 9; Heb. 6, 4 and 10, 32).

The second point links up with this. If "to baptize in Christ" may be understood as an abbreviation of "to baptize in the name

of Christ", then Romans 6, 3 can be seen as an explicitation of what was said above: "Do you not know that all of us who have been baptized into Christ Jesus were baptized into his death?" This means that not only the eucharist but baptism, too, calls forth and makes present the death of Jesus, so that the baptized person shares in it. And this holds not only for Jesus' death but also, as the rest of the text (Rom. 6, 4–11) shows, for his resurrection. The very descent into the baptismal water and the rising out of it are seen as a ritual representation of Jesus' burial and rising: "And you were buried with him in baptism, in which you were also raised with him through faith in the working of God, who raised him from the dead" (Col. 2, 12).

At baptism the name of Jesus or of Father, Son and Holy Spirit is pronounced over the baptized person, and through this is called forth what God has done with Jesus, the raising from the dead. And this is not a non-committal memory but a saving event in which the person shares and which has important consequences for him (Rom. 6, 5–11 and Col. 2, 20—3, 17). Thus, Jesus' resurrection from the dead is made actual, not only in the baptismal moment but also in the conduct of the person who is called upon to consider himself dead to sin and living for God in Christ Jesus (Rom. 6, 11). And although these texts make no mention of the word "remembrance" (in 2 Timothy 2, 8–13 the connection with baptism is too vague), the content of this "remembrance" is brought out in other terms so that baptism can be seen as a memorial celebration, a commemoration in the full sense of the word. If what I have said is correct, it would imply that a sacrament as such should have something of a memorial celebration.

III

The second presupposition which seems important for the interpretation of the sacrament is called by the particularly ugly name of "the corporative person". That this expression has be-

come accepted is nevertheless understandable. The reason is that this concept is difficult to put into words because it is connected with a typically Semitic way of thinking. This way of thinking was first methodically investigated by H. Wheeler Robinson, and later expanded by J. De Fraine.[7] In my view, the latter particularly has shown convincingly how very many texts of the New Testament are determined by this way of thinking. As typical of this we may take the Semite's real identification between a person and the community to which he belongs. From the point of view of the person this means that this person can be seen on the one hand as embracing all that lives in the community and, on the other, as the one who determines the community in a large measure. From the point of view of the community it means that the community projects onto one of the members all that is present in the community on the one hand, and, on the other, that it considers itself responsible for anything done by one of the members.

Following H. Wheeler Robinson, De Fraine then enumerates four characteristics:[8] (1) the compass of the "corporative personality" transcends the present and stretches back into the past and forward into the future; (2) the concept is marked by an almost real identification which goes in any case beyond the literary or idealizing identification, and turns the community into a real entity that is made fully actual in each of the members; (3) the concept is also marked by an extreme elasticity in the sense that one can pass easily, quickly and almost unnoticeably from the individual to the communal and *vice versa;* (4) lastly, it is characteristic of this concept that it survives periods in which the individual is more in evidence.

De Fraine himself thinks that Wheeler Robinson has somewhat underplayed the individual aspect, and he tries to solve this relationship between individual and community by a more dialectical approach. He also distinguishes some nine themes in which this way of thinking plays an important part: the head of the

[7] H. Wheeler Robinson, "The Hebrew Conception of Corporate Personality," in *Zeitschr. f. alltest. Wiss.*, Beiheft 66 (1936), pp. 49–61; J. De Fraine, *Adam et son lignage* (*Mus. Less.*, Sect. bibl. 2, 1959).

[8] *Op. cit.*, p. 18.

family and his "home", the good influence of the individual on the community, the bad influence of the individual on the community, the ancestor and posterity, the beneficent influence of the "fathers", the identity in name of clan and individual, the concrete personification of the community in the "you" (singular) in legislation.[9] He then applies some of this to six concrete cases: Adam, the king, the prophets, the Servant of Yahweh, the Son of Man, and the "I" of the Psalms.[10] This elaborate treatment seems to me to have the disadvantage of paying too little attention to those cases where the "corporative person" is seen as the initial figure of the particular community. These cases have, indeed, in common that another trend of thought plays along here which reinforces the "corporative personality" considerably, namely, the etiological trend of thought.

Etiology tries to explain what is in existence by referring to the real or supposed beginning. This often brings about that the existing is made to derive from some initial event that caused the present to be what it is.

When this beginning is a person (the father of the human race, a people, a tribe, clan or family), and there is identity of name (Adam, or the twelve patriarchs, etc.), the corporative character of this person is powerfully reinforced, much more than that of a random individual in the group, while here the limits of the living generation are also more clearly surpassed.

The importance of all this in the consciousness of the old Israel is clear from the inclination to press secondary relationships of tribe or clan (not based on the common ancestor or the head of the clan but, for instance, on a later alliance) all the same into some genealogy. This insistent application of the concept is not without interest since it was also used in the New Testament in the case of Christ who, in many instances, was seen as an initial figure. That some understanding of this way of thinking is necessary to grasp many passages in the New Testament has been clearly shown by De Fraine.[11]

[9] *Op. cit.*, pp. 43–112.
[10] *Op. cit.*, pp. 113–92.
[11] *Op. cit.*, pp. 193–217.

In a number of cases this is obvious, as, for instance, in the text about Adam and Christ (Rom. 5, 12–21). But it seems to me that this background is also valuable for the texts on baptism and the eucharist, and that the concept of the "corporative person" is important for the sacrament as such.

This is clear for baptism. Romans 5, where this category plays such an obvious part, is followed by a chapter where baptism and its implications are extensively dealt with.

Paul begins with a passage that presupposes an identification of the dying and rising Christ with those that descend into the baptismal water and rise out of it again: "Do you not know that all of us who have been baptized into Christ Jesus were baptized into his death? We were buried therefore with him by baptism into death, so that as Christ was raised from the dead by the glory of the Father, we too might walk in newness of life. For if we have been united with him in a death like his, we shall certainly be united with him in a resurrection like his. We know that our old self was crucified with him so that the sinful body might be destroyed, and we might no longer be enslaved to sin . . . But if we have died with Christ, we believe that we shall also live with him" (Rom. 6, 3–8). This remarkable unity with Christ is difficult to understand without the idea of the "corporative person". That there is an etiological strand in this way of thinking is clear, among other things, from Galatians 3, 26–9: "For in Christ Jesus you are all sons of God, through faith. For as many of you as were baptized into Christ have put on Christ. There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither slave nor free, there is neither male nor female; for you are all one in Christ Jesus. And if you are Christ's, then you are Abraham's offspring, heirs according to promise."

The unity with Christ, brought about by baptism, is a unity and identity in the sense in which a person is one with the community in the unity of a "corporative person". But because the baptized partake in the corporative personality of Christ, they will also partake in the "corporative person" to whom Christ belongs, and share therefore in the promises made to Abraham.

That is why baptism can be compared with circumcision: "In him also you were circumcised," not physically, through a bodily action, but in that circumcision of Christ, which is baptism. "And you were buried with him in baptism, in which you were also raised with him through faith in the working of God, who raised him from the dead" (Col. 2, 11).

It seems to me that there is more in the comparison between circumcision and baptism than merely that they can both be considered as an operative sign. Circumcision made a person a "man of Abraham"—baptism makes a person a "man of Christ". We must see in the same light what Paul says about the link between baptism and the one body, the body of Christ (1 Cor. 12, 12–31, esp. 12–3 and 27), although other concepts may also have had their influence here.

The theme of the one body is clearly linked with the idea of the "corporative person", as De Fraine has shown.[12] And it is precisely through this theme that the concept is also seen to operate in what Paul says about the eucharist, particularly where he brings baptism and eucharist together (though indirectly) in 1 Corinthians 10, 1f.: "The cup of blessing which we bless, is it not a participation in the blood of Christ? The bread which we break, is it not a participation in the body of Christ? Because there is one loaf, we who are many are one body, for we all partake of the same loaf" (1 Cor. 10, 16–7).

The reference to the "corporative person" considerably strengthens what was already present in the "for you" of the words of the institution according to Luke and Paul (Luke 22, 19–20; 1 Cor. 11, 24). This phrase seems to refer to the "for many" of Deutero-Isaiah (Is. 42, 6; 49, 8 and 53, 12), where the Servant of Yahweh is clearly shown to be a "corporative person". In this version of the words of institution the thought starts from the individual person, Jesus; in 1 Corinthians 10, 16–7 it starts—much more explicitly—from the communal situation, the Christian community that partakes of the bread and the cup. This is put into words that show a close connection with

[12] *Op. cit.*, pp. 202–17.

the way in which Paul speaks of baptism, in the same letter: "For by one Spirit we were all baptized into one body . . ." (1 Cor. 12, 12–3), namely, the body of Christ (v. 27). This shows that Paul saw baptism and eucharist in one perspective on this point.

This seems to me to justify the opinion that the idea of the "corporative person" is an element of the Christian notion of sacrament as such. Just as the "remembrance" of Jesus' death and resurrection gives a specifically Christian character to the immersion and the meal, so the connection with the corporative person of Christ provides in another way a specifically Christian dimension to baptism and the common meal.

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The Notion of "Major" or "Principal" Sacraments

I

The Data of Tradition

The idea that some sacraments are more important than others, particularly baptism and the eucharist, is well supported by traditional theology. In the age of the martyrs we have Ignatius of Antioch, Justin and Irenaeus, who describe these two sacraments as "faith" and "charity".[1] St. Augustine tells us that the people of Carthage called baptism "salvation" and the eucharist "life".[2] He himself wrote in his famous reply to Januarius, so often quoted in the Middle Ages: "Christ bound the community of his new people together by means of sacraments that were very few in number, easy to administer and clear in meaning, such as baptism with its invocation of the Trinity and the communion of his body and blood and some other ones insofar as there is mention of them in the canonical scriptures."[3] In the 11th century Peter Damian added a third one to them, the sacrament of order, to make up the "three most important sacraments".[4] A little later

[1] Ignatius, *Romans* VIII, 3; Justin, in a passage against Marcion quoted by Irenaeus, *Adv. Haer.* IV, 6, 2 (*P.G.* 7, 987C); Irenaeus, *Adv. Haer.* IV, 26, 5; 33, 9; V, 18, 2 (*P.G.* 7, 1056A, 1078 AB, 1173A). Cf. P. Nautin, *Je crois à l'Esprit-Saint dans la Sainte Eglise pour la Résurrection de la chair* (Paris, 1947), pp. 49 and 50, n. 2.

[2] *De pecc. merit. et remiss.* I, 24, 34 (*P.L.* 44, 128).

[3] *Ep.* 54, 1 (*P.L.* 33, 200); cf. *De doctr. christ.* III, 9 (*P.L.* 34, 71): texts quoted by Calvin, *The Institutes* IV, 19, 3.

[4] *Liber gratissimus* (against simony), c. 9 (*Libelli de Lite*, I, p. 27).

another supporter of Gregory VII wrote: "Holy Church, the mother of all . . . has received several sacraments. There are, however, but a few of them, two given by the Lord himself, others instituted by the apostles." [5] These the Lord officially commanded us to celebrate. The Middle Ages were less exacting than we are about the institution of the sacraments, and easily accepted the idea of an indirectly divine institution.[6] Shortly before 1140 the *Summa Sententiarum* called baptism and the eucharist "the two principal sacraments".[7] Hugh of St. Victor singled out for special treatment the three sacraments of Christian initiation, baptism, confirmation and the eucharist. This was sound tradition. One finds this, for instance, a little earlier in Rupert of Deutz,[8] and a little later in Hugh of Rouen who says of them that "they establish the city of God".[9] In connection with these three sacraments, Hugh of St. Victor says that there are "certain sacraments in which salvation consists and is received principally", and he adds, "such as the water of baptism and the reception of Christ's body and blood".[10]

It was Thomas Aquinas who molded these data of tradition into a balanced vision, doing justice to the various aspects of the truth. It was universally held that the sacraments which constituted the Church were symbolized by the water and blood that

[5] *Libellus de sacramentis* (not before 1089), in Muratori, *Antiquitates italicae* III (Milan, 1740), col. 599, or *P.L.* 150, 857.

[6] See H. Baril, *La doctrine de S. Bonaventure sur l'institution des sacrements* (Montreal, 1954), with the important review by P. G. Tavard, in the *Rev. des Et. aug.*, I (1955), pp. 196–7; V. Fagliolo, "L'istituzione del sacramento del matrimonio nella dottrina di S. Bonaventura," in *Antonianum* 33 (1958), pp. 241–62. For the theological side of the question, see also D. van den Eynde, "De modo institutionis sacramentorum," *ibid.* 27 (1952), pp. 3–10. Compare this with the position of Alexander of Hales in J. Bittremieux, "L'institution des sacrements d'après Alex. d'Halès," in *Eph. Theol. Lov.* (1932), pp. 234–51; Fr. Scholz, *Die Lehre von der Einsetzung der Sakramente nach Alex. von Hales* (Breslau, 1940) (should be brought up-to-date with regard to authenticity of writings).

[7] *P.L.* 176, 139A.

[8] *De victoria Verbi Dei* III, c. 11–3 (*P.L.* 169, 1471f.): he tries to show that these sacraments derive directly from Christ's death on the cross.

[9] *Contra Haer.* I, c. 5 (*P.L.* 192, 1260).

[10] *De sacramentis*, I, pt. 9, c. 7 (*P.L.* 176, 327A).

flowed from Christ's side on the cross and that these sacraments were baptism and the eucharist, "the most important sacraments". St. Thomas took up this theme to show that the sacraments draw their power from Christ's passion.[11] Elsewhere, in order to show that the bodily absence of the Lord required the institution of ministers for the administration of the sacraments to the faithful, he started from the institution of baptism and the eucharist, "which are the principal sacraments",[12] by Christ himself. Of course one could consider the order or hierarchy among the sacraments from different points of view. Baptism was the most important "in the order of necessity", but one might say that the sacrament of orders was the most important "in the order of perfection", and that the eucharist is without doubt the most important from the point of view of meaning and contents.[13]

The traditional theology of which I have quoted some texts led the Council of Trent to condemn the proposition that the seven sacraments are equal in every sense.[14] There were two opinions among the theologians that met on January 29, 1547. One section of them held that the proposition could not be condemned without some explanation; the others maintained that it was erroneous and false, and already condemned in various authoritative ways.[15] Apparently the latter won.

[11] *Summa theol.*, III, q. 62, a. 5 which concludes as follows: "To signify that water and blood flowed from Christ's side on the cross, of which the one refers to baptism, the other to the eucharist, which are the most powerful sacraments."

[12] *Contra Gentiles* IV, 72.

[13] *Summa theol.*, III, q. 65, a. 3, c. and ad 4m. For this dignity of the eucharist see q. 73, a. 3.

[14] Sess. VII, March 3, 1547, c. 3 (Denz. 846 = 1603). These canons were put to the general assembly on February 26. Cf. *Concilium Tridentinum* V/2 (ed. Goerresgesellschaft) p. 984, 1. 8–9.

[15] *Conc. Trid., ed. cit.*, 865, 1. 38f. The "authorities" referred to were: the famous Decretal of Innocent III Quum Marthae (*Decretalia* III, tit. XLI, c. 6, Friedberg II, 638): "Some think that two main sacraments flowed from the side of Christ, namely, that of redemption in the blood and that of regeneration in the water . . ."; a text attributed to Ambrose, taken from Gratian, *De Consecr.*, c. 99 D. IV, according to which baptism "condones all for nothing" (*omnia gratis condonat*) (Friedberg I, 1939); a passage from Pope Melchiades to the bishops of Spain, also taken from Gratian, *De consecr.*, c. 3 D.V. (col. 1413), which says that baptism and

Modern theologians broadly accept the idea of principal sacraments, either by reference to the traditional explanation of the water and blood that flowed from the side of Christ on the cross[16] or by reference to that canon of the Council of Trent.[17]

II

Reasons for "Grading" the Sacraments

The reasons for this grading may be found either in the source of the sacraments, namely, Christ, or in the effect of the sacraments on the faithful and the Church.

1. *The Source of the Sacraments*

Baptism and eucharist are clearly in a position of privilege due to a formal expression of Christ's will, attested by Scripture. The Lord himself determined matter and form, and, essentially, the rite and usage also. Without administering them himself strictly speaking, he directly sanctified the elements, either by his baptism (Mt. 5, 13–7; Mk. 1, 9–11; Lk. 3, 21–2), or by sharing the Passover meal with the apostles[18] and inserting into that meal the new sign of bread and wine (Mt. 26, 26–9; Mk. 14, 22–4; Lk. 22, 19–20; 1 Cor. 11, 23–5). These two sacraments are therefore special from the point of view of being instituted by the

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the imposition of hands are the two sacraments and are inseparable, but that, since the second is administered by superior ministers, namely, the pontiffs, it should be the object of greater respect (!); lastly, a text from Pseudo-Denys (*Hier. eccl.* 1, *P.L.* 3, 425), no doubt borrowed from St. Thomas (*S. th.* III, q. 65, a. 3, sed contra), which presents the eucharist as the sacrament that makes perfect absolutely. Note that at the general assembly of Feb. 10, 1547 Bracius Martellus, Bishop of Fiesole, has said that "among the sacraments that of baptism is the principal one among all others . . ." (*op. cit.*, 912, 1. 4).

[16] Thus Nicholas Coeffeteau, *Pro S. Monarchia Ecclesiae Romanae*, etc. (Paris, 1633), disc. cap. primi (in Rocaberti, *Bibl. Max. Pontif.* XVII, 23). Card. Mazzella, *De Ecclesia* (1880), p. 354; Van Noort, *De Ecclesia Christi* (3rd ed., 1913), p. 7.

[17] Thus C. Journet, *L'Eglise du Verbe incarné* II (Paris, 1951), pp. 669–70, referring to the ultimate primacy of the eucharist.

[18] Luke 22, 16–6; see the commentary by Bossuet, *Méditations sur l'Evangile*. La Cène, prt I, XVIIIth day.

Lord: this institution is more direct, explicit and formal than that of the other sacraments.

This priority is probably also due to their more solid relationship with the deed by which Jesus obtained salvation for us. It is true that all the sacraments are related to the Passover of the Lord, his death and resurrection,[19] and this holds equally and absolutely for all of them insofar as that is the only source of their efficacy. But insofar as their content and effective significance are concerned, the other five sacraments are less strictly related, i.e., from a certain angle only or less direct. Baptism and eucharist, on the contrary, are efficacious signs of the Passover by their very sacramental structure: for baptism see Romans 6, 1–11; Colossians 2, 11–3, and for the eucharist Matthew 26, 26–8; Luke 22, 19–20; 1 Corinthians 11, 23–6. Now, the Passover of the Lord lies at the very heart of what he did for us. It is there that Jesus effectively took upon himself our sinful situation and our condemnation, and by the same token it is there that he established himself effectively as our leader, our representative before God. Through this Passover, which embraces his death, resurrection and glorification, Christ became the source of a new, eschatological life for mankind. Because of this he had to die in our flesh and rise again in the Spirit: cf. Rom. 1, 2–4; 4, 23–5; Gal. 2, 19–21; 3, 26–9; 1 Cor. 15, 45–53; 1 Peter 3, 18; 4, 1–2 and 6. On the cross Christ became our second Adam and the effective leader and mediator of that life of reconciliation of the children of God. We must therefore associate and assimilate ourselves to Jesus Christ in his Passover. This is why St. Paul uses the famous verbs with the prefix *syn* to express our association with Christ at the various moments of his Passover. He speaks of "being crucified with, associated in his death, in his resurrection, in his being seated with God in heaven, in glory"; he does not speak of "being associated in the presentation in the temple, or the hidden life at Nazareth". No doubt, we are associated with him there, too, but not in the same way or at the same level.

[19] *Summa theol.* III, q. 49, a. 1; q. 62, a. 5, ad 1 and 2; *Constitution on the Church,* n. 7, 2, Cf. *supra* n. 8.

It is obvious that those sacraments, which by their meaning and content are directly and fully linked up with Christ's Passover and "re-present" the reality of this Passover in a certain real way, have a special and outstanding place in the overall sacramental structure.

2. *The Effect of the Sacraments*

What has just been said explains why a number of texts, quoted above, mention the Johannine symbol of the water and blood that sprang from the side of Christ on the cross. As far as I know, Tertullian is the first to mention this theme. From then on it would be easier and shorter to mention those Christian authors of East and West who do not use it than those that do.[20] This theme is practically always linked to that of Christ as the new Adam who gives himself and unites the Church, the new Eve, to himself: she springs forth from the side of the sleeping Christ.[21] This leads us to consider the special relationship of baptism and eucharist, compared with the other sacraments.

These two sacraments are called *praecipua, principalia, potiora* (more important, principal, more powerful) and this because of the part they play in the very constitution of the Church. This is already clear at the figurative or typical level of the Old Dispensation. For St. Paul, the community of Israel in the desert prefigures the Church, the new Israel: "Our fathers were all under the cloud,

[20] For an erudite treatment of the theme with many suggestions, see S. Tromp, "De nativitate Ecclesiae ex corde Iesu in cruce," in *Gregorianum* 13 (1932), pp. 489–527. See particularly St. Augustine, *In Ioann. Ev.* Tract. XV, 8 (*P.L.* 35, 1517); his contemporary Quodvultdeus said: "As the Gospel says, his side was pierced and straightaway blood and water flowed from it, which are the two sacraments of the Church," in *De Symb. ad Catech.* 15 (*P.L.* 40, 645); cf. St. John Chrys., *In Evang. Ioann.* Hom. 85, 3 (*P.G.* 59, 463); Theophylactus, *In Ioann.* c. 19 (*P.G.* 124, 281). One could extend this documentation indefinitely. It is the *traditional* interpretation. A exegete such as F. M. Braun sees in the blood and the water, not the eucharist and baptism, but the passion and the Spirit (cf. *Rev. thomiste,* 1949, pp. 17f.).

[21] The texts are innumerable. For plastic presentations, cf. E. Guldan, *Eva und Maria* (1966); for the Church as Bride and Queen, receiving the water and blood in a chalice, see A. Oepke, *Das neue Gottesvolk* etc. (Gütersloh, 1950), pp. 307–10.

and all passed through the sea, and all were baptized into Moses in the cloud and in the sea, and all ate the same supernatural food and all drank the same supernatural drink. For they drank from the supernatural Rock which followed them, and the Rock was Christ" (1 Cor. 10, 1–4).[22] Because he is thinking of Christian baptism and the Christian eucharist, Paul sees them prefigured in the Red Sea and the cloud, in the manna and the water of the rock. He sees there sacraments of unity, turning a multitude of people into the People of God. In the same way Christians are baptized into one single body (cf. 1 Cor. 12, 13; Gal. 3, 27) and constitute only one body (Christ's) because they eat of the same and only bread (1 Cor. 10, 17).

On both these occasions Paul speaks in terms of body and incorporation. When, however, we consider that baptism is traditionally and in reality "the sacrament of *faith*"; that the eucharist, and not baptism, is called the "body of Christ"; that this eucharist contains the very mystery of Christ and not only its power, and that it is clearly more closely related than baptism to the body of the Lord, we shall have no difficulty in seeing in baptism the sacrament that initiates men as "Church", the new People of God, and in the eucharist the sacrament which finally constitutes this people, this "assembly of the faithful", as the *body of Christ*. This is the way Vatican Council II speaks about it in the *Constitution on the Church* (n. 17) and in its *Decree on the Ministry* (nn. 2 and 5).

The Council has also hallowed the description of the Church as the "universal sacrament of salvation".[23] This, together with the concept of People of God, is one of Vatican Council II's richest contributions to ecclesiology. This theme had already been developed in Catholic theology for some ten years.[24] It obviously

[22] See L. Cerfaux, *La théologie de l'Eglise suivant saint Paul* (Unam Sanctam 10, Paris, 1942), pp. 76–7, 192–3, 219 n. 1.

[23] See *Constitution on the Church*, n. 48; cf. n. 1, 8 and implicitly, n. 17.

[24] O. Semmelroth, *Church and Sacrament* (Fides, 1965); K. Rahner, *The Church and the Sacraments* (New York, 1963); E. Schillebeeckx, *Christ, the Sacrament of the Encounter with God* (New York, 1963); see also in *L'Eglise de Vatican II* (ed. by G. Baraùna, Paris, 1966), the articles by B. Rigaux, T. Strotmann and P. Smulders, as well as H. Schlier,

uses the classical data of the treatise on the sacraments, but puts them into the perspective of salvation-history as set out by Paul in his letter to the Ephesians, under the name of "God's design" and "mystery". Seen in this light, the notion of sacrament assumes dynamic value; it is related to the world and its history. It becomes the concrete historical expression of God's design for salvation in this world, the sign and instrument through which God works out his decision to intervene with his grace in mankind and in creation in order to make them achieve the end for which he had destined them from the beginning: the condition of freedom of the sons of God (cf. Rom. 8, 18–30). Within the world the Church is the sign and instrument (*Constitution on the Church*, n. 1) of that renewal of the world on which God had irrevocably decided and of which the incarnation of his Son inserted the principle into history (*ibid.*, nn. 48, 3). The Church is this both insofar as she contains the means of grace (*Heilsanstalt*) and insofar as she is the People of God among all other peoples, yet owing her existence to a positive, supernatural act of God's grace.

Every one of the seven sacraments stands in this sign, but it is obvious that baptism is fundamental as constituting the People of God and the eucharist as creating and expressing the unity and communion of Christians in Christ Jesus. The other sacraments sanctify and christianize man in a special situation: sin, illness, marriage, spiritual service, but baptism (confirmation) and the eucharist constitute them as Christian persons pure and simple. They are basic.

Yet, insofar as the Church is constituted as the active sign of God's design for salvation, the sacrament of orders plays a decisive part along with these two: it "structures" the People of God by visibly representing Christ as head and as a sanctifier. The Church is not in the world only as a community of the sons of God and of those that are saved, but fully as the sign and instru-

Le temps de l'Eglise (Tournai, 1961), essays XII and XX; A. de Bovis, *L'Eglise et son mystère* (Je sais, je crois, Paris, 1961); M. J. Le Guillou, *Le Christ et l'Eglise. Théologie du mystère* (Paris, 1963); A. Winklhofer, *L'Eglise, présence du Christ* (Paris, 1966) (= *Ueber die Kirche*, Frankfurt, 1963).

ment of Christ as he actually saves and communicates this quality of "son of God". Therefore, insofar as the Church is the universal sacrament of salvation, the principal sacraments are baptism (completed in confirmation), *orders* and the eucharist.

In itself and educationally we are no doubt right in having a treatise on the sacraments in general. It is less fortunate that we usually place it before the study of each sacrament in particular because it tends to create the impression of a univocal concept that then becomes a rigid framework within which the study of the sacraments in their reality must fit. But the sacraments can only be generalized about in an analogical way. It would therefore be better to treat each one as it is in itself and then to see what they have in common and what can be said about sacraments in general. It is interesting to observe that, historically speaking, baptism and the eucharist served as the starting point and model when a treatise on the sacraments in general was composed in the 12th century. This seems to confirm that these two sacraments were recognized as "principal", "major" or "fundamental".

III

The Importance of This "Gradation" for Ecumenism

The teaching that I have tried to set out here is common to both East and West. Oriental theology is known to be essentially a theology of the divinization of man. The sacraments are the means of this divinization. And on this point the Greek Fathers have always given a position of priority to baptism and eucharist.[25] In his *Mystagogia,* Maximus the Confessor deals only with baptism and eucharist in detail.[26] Nicholas Cabasilas only treats of the three sacraments of Christian initiation.[27] Modern Greek

[25] See Gregory of Nyssa, *In cant.* 1 (*P.G.* 44, 776C); *Contra Eunomium* 3 (*P.G.* 45, 609Af.) and 7 (1277Bf.).

[26] *P.G.* 91, 657–717; S. Massimo Confessore. *La Mistagogia ed altri Scritti* (ed. R. Cantarella, Florence, 1931).

[27] Nicholas Cabasilas, *De vita in Christo* (*P.G.* 150, 493–725; French trs. by S. Broussaleux, *La vie en Jésus-Christ* (Amay-sur-Meuse, Belgium, 1932). See M. Lot-Borodine, "La grâce déifiante des sacrements d'après

Orthodox theologians point out that only baptism and eucharist are expressly reported as instituted by Christ; they call these sacraments the "principal" sacraments, and have stated that on this point they consider the Anglican position acceptable.[28]

Article 25 of the Church of England's Thirty-Nine Articles runs as follows: "There are two Sacraments ordained of Christ our Lord in the Gospel, that is to say, Baptism, and the Supper of the Lord. Those five commonly called Sacraments, that is to say, Confirmation, Penance, Orders, Matrimony, and Extreme Unction, are not to be counted for Sacraments of the Gospel, being such as have grown partly of the corrupt following of the Apostles, partly are states of life allowed in the Scriptures; but yet have not like nature of Sacraments with Baptism, and the Lord's Supper, for that they have not any visible sign or ceremony ordained of God."

There is no doubt that the Anglican position is dependent on that of Luther's Reformation. Luther used to speak of two sacraments as instituted by Christ himself.[29] It should be noted that Luther and also the Augsburg Confession always joined an explanation of confession to their teaching on baptism and eucharist.[30]

Nicolas Cabasilas," in *Rev. sc. phil. et théol.* 25 (1936), 299–330; for the whole Eastern tradition on this point see *idem,* "Initiation à la mystique sacramentaire de l'Orient," *ibid.* 24 (1935), pp. 664–75.

[28] See F. Gavin, *Some Aspects of Contemporary Greek Orthodox Thought* (London, 1923; photogr. repr. 1930); Androutsos, *The Validity of English Orders,* p. 58. The joint Orthodox-Anglican Commission, in its report published in 1932, contained the same declaration: "We accept that the two of the seven Sacraments, namely, Baptism and the Holy Eucharist (the first as introducing us into the Church, the second as uniting us with Christ) are preeminent among the others. But we do not think that the other five are of secondary importance as Sacraments . . ." (*Report of the Joint Doctrinal Commission appointed by the Oecumenical Patriarch and the Archbishop of Canterbury for consultation on the points of agreement and difference between the Anglican and the Eastern Orthodox Churches,* London, 1932, 14—English text—and 15—Greek text).

[29] *The Great Catechism* (1529), 4th pt. The Latin text is: "Superest ut se duobus quoque sacramentis ab ipso Christo institutis disseramus."

[30] In the *Great Catechism* the order is: baptism, eucharist, confession; in the Small Catechism of 1529 it is: baptism, confession, eucharist; in the Confession of Augsburg of 1530 it is: baptism (art. 9), eucharist (art. 10), confession (art. 11).

How far did they refuse a sacramental character to confession? Pressed by the Catholics to say whether he accepted seven sacraments, Melanchthon appealed in his *Apologia of the Augsburg Confession* to the lack of precision and vacillations of the old theology.[31] One could only truly call sacraments those rites for which there was proof that they were instituted by God. In these circumstances he counted as sacraments baptism, the Lord's Supper and absolution or the sacrament of penance, but, without denying their usefulness, he excluded confirmation and extreme unction, and only accepted orders as a sacrament, if one understood by that the ministry of the Word, while he accepted marriage only with many reservations.

Calvin also admitted that one could call sacrament the imposition of hands by which ministers or pastors were received in office, but he maintained, more firmly than Melanchthon, that there were only two sacraments, basing himself on the criterion of a divine institution attested by Scripture,[32] while he distinguished "the five other ceremonies" from these two, as they were "of a lower degree".[33]

I am aware of the fact that to restore in our theology, and therefore afterwards in our catechetics, the traditional idea of "major" sacraments may risk encouraging the Protestant denial of the proper sacramental quality of the other sacraments. But we have seen that this denial is not absolute, but is limited to the aspect of the immediate and explicit institution by Christ. Nevertheless, underneath all this there lies the question of the apostolic tradition, its reality and its proper normative value. All the discussions that are taking place between our Reformed brethren and ourselves show a high degree of closeness and cohesion. We must obviously remain faithful to what a tradition, wholly common to East and West, teaches about the sacraments and their number, since this tradition stems from the undivided Church of

[31] *Apologia,* art. XIII; in *Die Bekenntnisschriften der evangelisch-lutherischen Kirche* (3rd ed., Göttingen, 1956), pp. 291f.
[32] *Institution chrétienne* IV, 14, 20 and 22; 18, 20.
[33] *Op. cit.,* IV, 19.

the first thousand years. But this should not prevent our accepting the idea that there are principal or major sacraments, as indeed this same tradition prompts us to do. By doing this in the sense of this tradition we shall make the ecumenical dialogue on the sacraments more fruitful.

This is not the only case where the truth, like the concern for a new ecumenical *rapprochement* (as John XXIII would say), encourages us to recognize that there is a grading, a hierarchy, of certain realities which, though going by the same name, are neither heterogeneous or equivocal nor identical. There are major Councils, even among those called "ecumenical".[34] There are major Patriarchates, the five considered such by ancient tradition. The Latin Church venerates twenty-five "Doctors of the Church", and yet, there are four Greek and four Latin ones who are traditionally considered more important than the others. In the same way, the conciliar *Decree on Ecumenism* says that there is a certain hierarchy among the truths to be believed and the teachings to be taught (n. 11). This point is so important that it deserves an article by itself. This is, moreover, also a traditional point.[35] It seems to me, as to several fathers of the Council and a number of observers, that this statement of the *Decree on Ecumenism* is one of the most important made by the Council.

Formally or legally considered, all dogmas, all "ecumenical" Councils, all sacraments are equal. But looking at things from the point of view of their *content,* their place in the saving structure of the Church, and that of "sacred doctrine", we must accept that there are major dogmas, major "ecumenical" Councils and major sacraments.

[34] See my essay on "La primauté des quatre premiers conciles oecuméniques," in *Le concile et les conciles* (Paris, 1960), pp. 75–109.

[35] To quote one text, because close to the matter of this article (sacrament means here "revealed mystery"): "And as the sacraments are not all equal but one is greater and another is lesser, therefore St. Paul now says: This is a great sacrament." (Et quia non omnia aequalia sacramenta sunt, sed est aliud sacramentum majus et aliud minus, propterea et nunc dicit: Sacramentum hoc magnum est. Rabanus Maurus, *In Epist. ad Ephes.*, c. 5, *P.L.* 112, 461C.)

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MAN AND THE SACRAMENTS: The Anthropological Substructure of the Christian Sacraments

I

The Integration of Human Life

Whatever approach we take to man, or to the present-day images he draws of himself, we always come up against the problem of *integration*. It is the major problem for any living being. Of himself, he is never all that he can be; he depends on something else, which he possesses to a greater or lesser extent and which is indispensable for his full completion. "As those things which he *has* multiply and become more differentiated, so much the stronger must *be* the animating principle in him which underlies all these diversified possessions. It is a matter of life and death. Failure in this matter may only result in an unhappy life; but it may also mean total death." [1]

So we may well ask: What in man's life could be strong enough to serve as the unifying pole for all these diverse elements that make up his existence? What could provide dynamic unity and the opportunity for further development, while at the same time respecting the diversity and the dialectic tension of these elements?

To put it another way, man cannot help but see that his life is frighteningly fragmented, that he is only partly himself at all

[1] Cf. P. R. Regamey, *Pauvrété chrétienne et construction du monde,* where the drama of integration with regard to being and having is delineated well; see also the relevant pages in *Portrait spirituel du chrétien,* (Paris: Ed. du Cerf, 1963).

times. "At all times we are only a fraction of our being. In the depth of our nature there is a wound that prevents us from being one. This obstacle, the origins of which we do not know, undoubtedly because it is our origin, is brought home to us by such images as 'the time for death' and 'paradise lost'." [2] Yet man cannot escape the need to unify his existence.

How is this unity to be achieved? The response to this question is the unfolding drama played out by every man, the drama of integration.

The fact is that unity exists for man only on the level of the unconscious; only there, are all the events of his existence embraced. But in that case we are talking about a unity that is effected below the threshold of his free being, a unity of which he may well become the victim. That is why each individual tries to provide his own unity by means of words, language and all the other self-schematizations that provide a more or less integrated picture of his existence. At some point, however, this unification may well appear to be more or less artificial; it may well appear to be the arbitrary result of influences that are external to a greater or lesser degree. The individual has recovered himself; but it is not really himself at all, it is a mask, a "persona". He has played around with the dissociated fragments of his existence as best he could, and a certain amount of repression has come into play.

"A man is the sum total of his own misfortunes. He thinks that one day misfortune will finally wear itself out; instead, time itself becomes his misfortune" (Faulkner).

"Uncertain of everything from the start, we are still free to ponder the future with all our strength. Are we in our death-throes, or is something wonderful being born? We are ever on the verge of migration to some new world, any world, so long as it does not resemble our own." [3]

[2] P. Emmanuel, *Le goût de l'un* (Paris: Ed. du Seuil, 1962), p. 103.
[3] G. Picon, *Panorama des idées contemporaines* (Paris: Ed. Gallimard, 1957), pp. 16–19.

And so the dilemma is posed: to achieve self unity, must we become the victims of our own unconscious, or be condemned to the unreality of our own speech?

This notion of integration can be formulated negatively or positively. If we consider the things we have to unify, the things we have, then we tend to look for some positive element that will allow us to maintain possession of these things. If, on the other hand, we consider possible unifying principles, we legitimately tend to work by a process of exclusion, eliminating one after the other. In the latter case, integration is formulated negatively. In both instances it would seem that the truth is bound up with a questioning process, for a man can never assume that he possesses his integrating principle as he does other things. Were he to make this assumption, the process of integration would come to a halt. Since we are spirit, unity must be a progressive process, continually moving forward through our "yes" and our "no". It is a continuing dialectic, always open to the future.

Let me pose this critical question again, using one negative and one positive example; this is the only way we can ascertain the anthropological status of the sacraments. Putting it negatively, we might ask this question: "What is it that I cannot resign myself to without feeling my self slip away between my fingers? What would cause my disintegration if I were to subscribe to it?" [4]

Putting it positively, we can cite the example of the huge *Diplodocus* dinosaur: "These animals produced a huge quantity of flesh, and had to construct a gigantic bone system to support their weight. This, in turn, called for a long chain of tail so that equilibrium might be established. Their huge bodies covered a large area, so a heavy armored plate of protective material was also required. In other words, they had to assemble a huge ensemble of dead matter, to which was added other inert structure such as teeth and claws. The beast was a quasi-mechanical machine that multiplied its parts. The living organism became merely the

[4] F. Giroud, *L'express* (June 11, 1967), p. 95.

support of various non-living mechanisms, and the interminable contradictions eventually led to its annihilation." [5]

It is clear from this example that "having" is not enough. It is not enough to establish equilibrium among the parts. In the last analysis, the total ensemble cannot just be an inert mass. All the elements and factors that enter into man's daily life must be informed by some vital principle; they must contribute to the efficiency of the whole organism. If they do not, a terrible revenge will be exacted.

If a man does not really integrate his existence, he will never escape from fear and unrest; and one day he will cease to exist as a human being.

In this article I shall isolate three major sectors where the problem of integration exists. I shall try to show that this problem must be faced, and that the sacraments can help us to achieve integration in these areas, in a real and meaningful way. What are these three sectors? (1) In relation to himself, man is led to integrate his own individual limits, up to and including the final limit, death. (2) In relation to the world, man encounters others and discovers that his relationship to them is a decisive factor in his existence. (3) Finally, man discovers the weight of other intermediaries, of other things; in particular, he discovers the weight of symbols—things that are both themselves and something else at the same time.

II

Individual Limits

The problem of limits crops up continuously as we experience a disproportion between the range of our desire and the object that presents itself as the fuel and the response to this desire. The young Claudel expressed it well in *Tête d'or:* "God promises through his creatures, but fulfills on his own." Or, as the young Malraux commented on his prison experiences: "What was hu-

[5] Cited by Regamey, in *Pauvrété chrétienne et construction du monde* (Paris: Foi vivante, 1967), p. 79.

man freedom but the awareness and the systematization of one's fatalities?" [6]

Whatever category of thought we adopt to explain the structure and the course of human destiny, we always run into certain constants, no matter how differently we may formulate them:

1. We *recognize a dynamism and a desire* that governs the whole history of the human person. In terms of ontology, we may try to account for this desire with a philosophy of liberty: the will is viewed as made for some good which is related to it in terms of finality and which always goes beyond the individual goods presented to the will; the will governs the process of obtaining these goods. This, in brief, is the outlook of Aristotelian and Augustinian philosophy.[7]

Utilizing a completely different perspective, we can describe this dynamic process by analyzing the real state of the individual, his archeology and teleology, in terms of the pursuit of subjective fullness and the narcissistic need for self-congruence. This, in brief, is the outlook of various modern psychologies and psychoanalysis.[8]

[6] A. Malraux, *Le temps du mépris* (Ed. Gallimard), p. 144. Then there are the classic analyses of J. P. Sartre in *L'Etre et le néant* (Paris: Ed. Gallimard, 1943), Part IV and *passim:* e.g., p. 514, pp. 653–54—Eng. Tr.: *Being and Nothingness.*

[7] This is the classic definition of freedom by St. Thomas. There is a disproportion between two things in man: his infinite and irrevocable open-endedness to the good as a totality, which underlies his irreversible desire for total fulfillment, and his encounter with limited objects, none of which can fulfill this program. At one and the same time we are condemned to totality and to limitation. See, for example, Ia, q. 83, a. 3; 2 *Contra Gent.*, chap. 47: where liberty is defined as "dominium et potestas sui actus *ad opposita*".

[8] See, among others, J. M. Pohier, *Psychologie et théologie* (Paris: Ed. du Cerf, 1967), *passim:* "At his start and throughout his life, man is characterized by his pursuit of narcissistic completeness. In this state, he would be in perfect congruence with himself and his world. This state is envisioned as a reality in some world that exists before history or after it. The impossible attainment of omnipotence is pursued in history itself by what Freud calls the infantile megalomania of desire.

"From birth onward, a human being finds himself hurled into a world where he, more than any other living thing, is radically dependent on beings or on objects (it is not just a difference of degree). It is in a system of relations to these objects that he, throughout his life, will be able to

2. This dynamism and this desire are recognized to be *totalitarian.*

3. Hence, the simultaneous awareness of *disproportion* and *lack of congruence* which constitutes the normal condition of all integration and all liberty.[9]

4. Man's experience of these disproportions puts him in a situation where he must *make room for negativity, for limits.*

5. Several possible solutions are suggested to him:

(a) The first solution, I think, is to plunge into forgetful *oblivion.* Man distracts himself with some form of inebriation. He may, for example, indulge in esthetic creation and plunge into the world of imagination. With the help of other objects he tries to acquire a self-image that he would like to see but does not yet

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find the only possible self-realization and the only possible integration with the world; the operation of these relations to objects is insured by his drives. Throughout its course, personality development will be characterized by a fluctuation between two poles: (1) narcissistic pursuit of omnipotence; (2) a drive-directed relationship to objects, which prove to be distinct from the person and thus contradicts his narcissistic outlook" (*op. cit.*, p. 349).

Note also the comments and analysis of J. Y. Jolif, *Comprendre l'homme* (Paris: Ed. du Cerf, 1967): "Man cannot be regarded as a thing closed in and on himself, as an absolute end. A humanism that would make man not only a central value, but an ultimate and positively consummate value, ends up being overhuman. The human is human only if it is put forward as mediation, negativity and, in our sense of the word, transcendence. To use the terms of Nietzsche, it must be regarded as a bridge not a goal, as a transition point not an end point. Humanism survives only insofar as it escapes from itself. Although it is the ground on which man can take a firm stand, it shifts constantly beneath our feet." (p. 89).

[9] In *Totem and Tabu* Freud says that religion somehow represents "the victory of the reality principle over the pleasure principle, but on the mythical level; that is why it is the supreme form of the surrender of desire and, at the same time, the supreme form of the fulfillment of desire" (p. 272).

In his reflections on the life instinct and the death instinct, Freud notes that "culture" gives man a power that was once conferred on the gods, and that man struggles with this power because it is marked with a finiteness that cannot be easily reconciled with the omnipotence of desire. This is the theme of *Civilization and Its Discontents.* Man has no more difficult or urgent task than to "convert his desire toward the finite". Man must learn the harsh law of reality: "Infantilism is meant to be surmounted; men cannot be children forever; they must eventually venture forth into the hostile world" (*The Future of An Illusion,* p. 135).

have; he acquires mastery over certain representations that provide him with protection and security in the face of the external world. He uncovers an unlimited power that continually renews itself; as he projects himself from work to work, he feels his existence and actually fashions it.

Physical possession and all the other means of acquisition also give existence to desire and to plans. They provide man with the possibility of something outside him and the possession of something positive. Possession enables him to forget the undeniable limitations on the things that he has; it allows him to cherish the illusion that there are no limits to the fulfillment of his desires.

(b) The second way of escaping negation and limitation is, in my opinion, *conflict and flight*. It can take two forms: domination or submissiveness. In either case, a man is unwilling to accept the fact that his unblemished self-image is challenged. He has this image of his ideal self, and he takes flight whenever he finds a gap between this ideal image and reality. Either he retreats into passive submissiveness and depression, or else he flees by accusing and condemning those around him who oppose his self-fulfillment by their otherness.

(c) The third approach open to man is *to embrace negativity and move beyond it*. Here, I think, is one of the decisive anthropological foundations of sacramental life. Like it or not, every man stands in relation to an ideal picture of self. At birth we are not totally at one with our full self; hence we must define ourselves as beings who are involved in a continuing process of development and fulfillment, who are in a state of potentiality. In other words, we are "subjects", who cannot help but stand in a relation of dependence to something else. We discover this dependence and we master it by means of this image of an ideal self. It is the self we would like to be, although we are not it yet, and we already possess it as an image inside us. We turn back to this image constantly through our plans, our fears, and our regrets. It is here that the fate of each man is played out, as he runs into the inevitable obstacles posed by existence.

This all-embracing image, which each man has of himself, can-

not be regarded as an ultimate. It must be relativized and shot through with negativity, or tragedy will ensue. This does not mean that our anguish will be suppressed; it will always be there. But this anguish itself will help us to discover gradually the illusory character of our ideal self and our possibility of achieving it by moving beyond it.

6. Now what do the sacraments offer us? Let us put it briefly. As we encounter each of the great experiences offered to man, the sacraments offer us the possibility of cooperating in this experience in all its concreteness, but in the name of Another's power. Without repudiating our most personal elements, indeed for the sake of our total integration and our total retrieval of existence,[10] the sacraments offer us a chance to cooperate concretely in our own fulfillment, while demanding that we drastically relativize our self-image.

Let me give some examples. Man is a father, he gives life. It is a fundamental experience. And then someone comes along and says that his child will find his true image only through baptism. A man loves. But even before he discovers his fundamental polygamy and the open-endedness of his desire, the danger that he may transfer this desire to others, someone offers him the help of God to insure his fidelity. In gathering up his past, man encounters his failures; then someone comes along and offers him the chance not only to be pardoned and to forget past faults, but also to use sin itself as the occasion for moving ahead and gaining control of one's life—by living in friendship with another, Christ. Finally, man fears death; and someone offers him the chance, not of escaping it, but of making it a free act through the help of another, to whom he surrenders himself.

[10] I have developed these ideas at greater length in another work, in which the reader can find extensive bibliographical references to contemporary theories on man: B. Bro, *L'homme et les sacrements: Faut-il encore pratiquer?* (Paris: Ed. du Cerf, Foi Vivante, 1967). In particular, see the bibliographies related to the following topics: "Signes et symboles," p. 419; "l'homme dans le temps," p. 428; "l'assemblée chrétienne," p. 416; "la révolution du dialogue," pp. 39–54; also these topics in the index—Anthropologie, Historicité, Langage, Symbole, Temps, Analyse structurale.

All these experiences are encountered progressively and lived through in hope. There is no evasion. The whole process takes account of the reality of time, and it gives meaning to our history. It teaches us to love our own history because someone other than us has taken command of it.

III

Others

In the various aspects of his life—reasoning, affectivity, and action—man encounters limits on the totality of his desire. He also discovers that "others" are a perpetual menace to the full fruition of his desire. To his discouragement he finds that they are and remain external to him.

Man experiences a permanent need for the presence and the protection of others; but at the same time he fears these others. Self-realization is caught between a "father complex" (we are destined to be children forever) and the concomitant revolt on the one hand, and the permanent need for protection and security sought from another.[11]

Our relationship to another, to others, poses some serious problems of integration. These conflicts exist on every level, in the life of families and the life of nations. Relationships between ourselves and others are infinitely difficult, whether it be a question of obeying authority or of sharing responsibility for some wrong. We may gain a greater awareness of the role of mass media. We may penetrate more deeply into the laws and structures of societal life, but this will not solve the problems of integration vis-à-vis others, because such analysis may remain quite abstract. Inevitably, there remains a twofold conflict.

1. We cannot form an adequate or exhaustive image of an-

[11] Cf. J. M. Pohier, "Au nom du Père," *Esprit* (March-April, 1966); P. Ricoeur, *De l'interprétation* (Paris: Ed. du Seuil, 1965), pp. 242ff., and *passim:* they go back over the analyses made by Freud, particularly in *The Future of An Illusion.*

other. The freedom and subjectivity of my companion represents a point of departure from which there is no escape. I do not really grasp him as he is. In attempting to identify with him, I must use intermediaries that are necessarily inadequate. I fashion an idea of him which never ceases to betray both him and me.

Furthermore, if this other person has responsibility over my group, I am constantly tempted to regard his representation of the group as inadequate. By what right does he represent the overall group, the community?

2. At the same time, it is impossible for the other person to respect me when he intervenes in my life. By the very fact of his existence, he comes ahead of me. I count for nothing in his existence, and this fact is irreversible. Sartre describes this problem forcefully: over against me there stands someone who never leaves me in peace; by the very fact that he is another, he challenges me. In every sphere of activity (thinking or doing) I am asked to make the ideas and decisions of another my own, while still remaining the free, creative source of my own activity.

A. de Peretti, using the concepts of Carl Rogers, summarizes the dialectic very well:

"The need for growth is incoercible. It takes place within the bosom of an individual being, through the elaboration of a *self-image*. This image dynamically organizes the actualization of potentialities and the control of behavior. It develops as a dynamic form, as a *gestalt,* which *enriches* and *preserves* the experience acquired directly by the individual in the expression of his organic totality.

"Now this image is found to have a relationship to others. This relationship involves constant revision and modification of the image that one has of oneself. In the course of these revisions and modifications, certain anxieties crop up. (They are the result of displacement or dissipation of energy, a Joule's effect, as it were, involving resistance to interpersonal relationships.) To avoid these anxieties, the individual may react defensively and adopt an attitude of *dependence* or *imitation*. In this case, his

inertia or his insecurity leads him 'to evaluate his experience in terms of criteria borrowed from others, rather than evaluating them on the basis of the satisfaction (or lack of satisfaction) he himself experiences'. In other words, '*he adopts the scale of values of other individuals* to determine the positive or negative value of things which he has experienced' (Cf. Kinget and Rogers, *Psychothérapie et relations humaines,* p. 186).

"Thus the individual creates an internal discord that is more or less pronounced; his *authenticity* is injured, he is alienated. A portion of his immediate or past experience is subtracted from his consciousness on the basis of considerations that are external to himself. The thrust toward actualization is diverted from its proper course. The individual becomes vulnerable. Now his personality functions in an aggressive and costly manner. His perceptions become rigid, so that he may preclude certain feelings that are now partially incompatible with the self-image which he is forming and which he dares not allow to develop on its own. The individual, with all his internal complexity, now boxes himself within the simplistic support of a conformist group and closed models of behavior.

"On the other hand, the individual can preserve his freedom and his authenticity. In certain relationships he can be 'congruent' with his experience as it develops with others. In this case, he finds within himself the basis and the justification for the feelings he experiences. He affirms his own experience, and acknowledges the *limits* implied in it. In this case we can say that the individual, being in a state of authenticity or congruence, *accepts himself* actively: that is, *he takes account of the total picture that is emerging in him.* This self-acceptance is an acceptance of evolution, under the thrust of growth. Self-acceptance means being mobile. It means using 'negation' to undo established defense mechanisms. It means being truly *present* to oneself." [12]

What do the sacraments offer us here? It seems to me that current pastoral efforts have contented themselves with vague

[12] A. de Peretti, "Carl Rogers ou les paradoxes de la présence," in *Les Etudes* (February, 1967), pp. 155–56.

general ideas and have not followed through with their efforts. Too often they have misconstrued the real substructures of sacramental life and have focused on facile, seductive abstractions.[13] To be sure, we have discovered that the notions of individual piety and individual salvation were not Christian, that the Church is essentially a communion, and that any sacramental scheme must therefore involve "another".[14]

But while we may rejoice over the rediscovery of the communitarian nature of the sacramental system, we must realize that current work in the social sciences obliges us to do more than administer collective rites. There is always the temptation that Christian communitarianism will degenerate into sociological collectivity.[15] We can only hope that the Holy Spirit and the psychic health of the laity will join forces, forcing those responsible for the sacraments to gradually discover the fundamental laws of group life and of authentic community living.

Here I should merely like to delineate the essential elements

[13] That liturgical reform could be carried out without any reference to the work being done in psychology and the other social sciences is highly unfortunate. It is, I feel, a sad indication of our failure to look at *reality*. Happily, things seem to be changing. However, for the past twenty years liturgical reform, and of a rather good quality, has taken place without any attention to psychology; it is a clear sign of the backwardness of ecclesiastical thinking. When a Congress on "liturgy and the spiritual life", such as that at Angers in 1962, does not hear anything from a social scientist, one must question the realism of the liturgy and the spiritual life such a Congress proposes.

[14] Cf. B. Bro, *op. cit:* "La révolution du dialogue," pp. 39–55; "Aimer ou subir la liturgie," pp. 247–70; "L'assemblée chrétienne," bibliography pp. 416–19.

[15] *Ibid.*, pp. 327–29: "Le collectif n'est pas le communautaire." We must firmly reject the foolish tendency to equate the common (hence, superior) good with collective activity, and individual (hence, inferior) good with private action. If a private act is truly an act of the spirit, it is an act of communion by its very nature; if it is spiritual, it is necessarily an opening out. Hence, it is useless to invoke the primacy of the common good over individual good in order to prove the superiority of a collective action over an individual or interior act. A truly "interior" act is never confined with the limits of the individual; as the high point of individual activity, it opens out to the whole community of spirits. We have every right to say that the more personal and personalized an action is, the more it expresses a spiritual nature, the more universal it is.

involved in the integration of otherness as it is offered to us by the sacraments. I hesitate to use the word "dialogue" in this connection, because it is an ambiguous term and because it must be qualified constantly when the "other" is God.[16] Here we must always remind ourselves that we are dealing with a relationship that is dialectic by its very nature. The "other" is alien to me; yet he is the only instance of absolute and wholly integrative unity, because his existence includes mine. That is why we must constantly qualify what we say about man's relationship to God.

This "other" is wholly one, but his Word reaches me in the varied situations of an incarnate human existence—that of Christ. He sparks my development, but he does so by offering me a salvation plan that goes beyond me. He appeals to a unifying point of reference, but he integrates all the members of the human race, all the "others".

1. The sacraments are communion with God, first of all. They are communion with the One who, by his very nature, is beyond every fragmented grasp and every limiting word. Only insofar as his presence transcends my human condition does it reveal its unifying value. Only insofar as we surmise that he is the only "one" does his otherness reveal its ultimate efficaciousness: its ability to unify my life. It is only because he is "other" that he can save me; and I finally come to the point where I love this "difference", because it makes dialogue a real possibility. It is a blessed distinction, because it enables us to escape multiplicity.

However, this vertical identification is offered to us through communion with someone who has lived a history that is similar to my own. It is possible for me to identify with his history, from start to finish. We are not dealing with an idea or an idol; we are dealing with an incarnation, the incarnation of Christ. We are dealing with an existence that is totally in keeping with our desire and our capacity to identify with something that is one,

[16] St. Thomas quite rightly dwelled on the virtues of otherness at great length. It is in this connection that he discusses cultic worship, prayer, and all the acts associated with religion.

[illegible] planning our own destiny. And this remains in Another, the [illegible] which promises to effect our own integration, is offered to us in conjunction with the most profound and most varied experiences of our life. (This, in fact, seems to be the distinctive characteristic of the sacramental economy.) For [illegible] there is baptism; for failure and death, there is penance and the last anointing; for social responsibility there is confirmation and holy orders; for love there is marriage; for our existence in time and our life with others, there is the eucharist.

3. This communion, this identification, is offered to us in a dialogue, where we come to discover that the Father is the one who takes the initiative. (It may well be the only real dialogue where the Father does not just speak with us.) Yet, at the same time we come to realize that his initiative is aimed at making us the source and the master of our own creation. This is the remarkable reversal which the sacraments offer to us. In relating us to God they turn the tables upside down. The ties of dependence are switched around. God does much more than show respect for our freedom. Here the Father, who is by nature father, creator and source (with all that implies), puts himself in our hands; we become the foundation and wellspring of our own salvation, the creators of our own destiny.

It is an astonishing reversal. When we decide not to dispose of God [illegible], when we freely choose to surrender to his place in the sacraments, at that moment we actually do make what use we will of God.

4. However, we discover that we are the masters of our destiny only by accepting a dialogue which cuts right through our own words and our own self-image. We are not asked to live a contemplative life, but we are asked to commune with the life of Another, of someone else in the eucharist. We are not asked to repair our failures on our own, but we are asked to confess to someone. We are not simply asked to guarantee fidelity to our love; we are asked to discover that every love involves an infinite, divine presence.

This whole process of cooperation is so real that it seems that

[illegible]

[illegible] Christ. The only way [illegible] psychologists have been able to describe the integrating function of the sacramental relationship is in terms of death or [illegible]. Only unconditional self surrender enables the Christ [illegible] to restore us to ourselves.

With regard to the full richness of our existence, to our freedom and autonomy, sacramental identification with Another seems to have two additional qualities. It is offered to us through the intermediary of the only existence that has ever been "psychoanalytically pure". Considering all the caprices and obstacles of which men are aware "in the face of their Father", it was only fitting that sometime, somewhere, mankind should have lived a pure and authentic filial relationship, in the full radiance of truth. This point was the consciousness of Christ and, by the wondrous designs of divine love, this Christ was truly the Son of God.

He showed us not only the full perfection of natural religion but also the secret of supernatural worship. And the human soul of Christ, for the first time, lived the father-son relationship in all its fullness and perfection. In the human soul of Christ we discovered how man could say "Abba, Father" without introducing unconscious conflicts into this cry. And so, "taught by our divine Savior, we dare to say: Our Father . . ."

This person, who becomes our unifying reference point in the sacraments, establishes us in full congruence with ourselves; thus he can restore us to complete communion with our brothers. The other is no longer "an" other. The sacraments enable us to enter into communion with that secret point where he, too, can say, "Our Father". The eucharist is not just the food that gives force and unity to my existence; it is the repast of communion at the same time. Penance is not simply the absolution of my

while retaining our own diversity. And this recourse to Another, this recourse which promises to effect our own integration, is offered to us in conjunction with the most profound and most varied experiences of our life. (This, in fact, seems to be the distinctive characteristic of the sacramental economy.) For fatherhood, there is baptism; for failure and death, there is penance and the last anointing; for social responsibility, there is confirmation and holy orders; for love, there is marriage; for our existence in time and our life with others, there is the eucharist.

2. This communion, this identification, is offered to us in a dialogue, where we come to discover that the Other is the one *who takes the initiative*. (It may well be the only real dialogue where the Other does not join ranks with us.) Yet, at the same time we come to realize that his initiative is aimed at making us the source and the master of our own creation. This is the remarkable reversal which the sacraments offer to us. In relating us to God, they turn the tables upside down. *The ties of dependence are switched around*. God does much more than show respect for our freedom. Here the Other, who is by nature father, creator and source (with all that implies), puts himself in our hands; we become the fountainhead and wellspring of our own salvation, the creators of our own destiny.

It is an astonishing reversal. When we decide not to dispose of God or ourselves, when we freely choose to surrender to his grace in the sacraments, at that moment we actually do make what use we will of God.

3. However, we discover that we are the masters of our destiny only by accepting *a dialogue which cuts right through our own words and our own self-image*. We are not asked to live a contemplative life; but we are asked to commune with the life of Another, of someone else in the eucharist. We are not asked to repair our failures on our own; but we are asked to confess to someone. We are not simply asked to guarantee fidelity to one love; we are asked to discover that every love involves an infinite, divine presence.

This whole process of cooperation is so real that it seems that

God really wants to be conquered by our intervention. On the one hand, his sacramental presence is so real that it precludes our own words from being the ultimate thing; on the other hand, it is we who are the masters of this process, who decide whether it shall come to fruition or not.

Moreover, this salvific Word presents itself as participation in a body, in a real physical communion, in Christ. The only way psychologists have been able to describe the integrating plenitude of the sacramental relationship is in terms of death or sexual intercourse. Only unconditional self-surrender enables the Other to restore us to ourselves.

With regard to the full richness of our existence, to our freedom and autonomy, sacramental identification with Another seems to have two additional qualities. It is offered to us through the intermediary of the only existence that has ever been "psychoanalytically pure". Considering all the cancers and obstacles of which men are aware "in the face of their Father", it was only fitting that sometime, somewhere, mankind should have lived a pure and authentic filial relationship, in the full radiance of truth. This point was the consciousness of Christ and, by the wondrous designs of divine love, this Christ was truly the Son of God.

He showed us not only the full perfection of natural religion but also the secret of supernatural sonship. And the human soul of Christ, for the first time, lived the father-son relationship in all its fullness and perfection. In the human soul of Christ we discovered how man could say "Abba, Father" without introducing unconscious conflicts into this cry. And so, "taught by our divine Savior, we dare to say: Our Father . . ."

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sins; it is reintegration into the reciprocal relations that form the communion of believers. When Christ says: "What you do to the least of my brethren, you do to me," or "As you measure out, so shall it be measured to you," when he invites us to love as he loves, to love as the Father loves him, we are touching on the essential characteristic of the innovation wrought by Christianity. It is no longer: "Do unto others as you would have others do unto you," but "Do unto others as you would have God do unto you." It is "Forgive us our trespasses, as we forgive those who trespass against us."

To go to confession is to do more than re-enter fraternal communion; it is to ask that we might see our brothers as God sees them. If it only involved the re-establishment of peace between ourselves and others, then the psychiatrist or the lawyer could probably do a better job. The communitarian aspect of penance obviously involves much more. In penance we accept Christ's intervention; we share his energy in the battle against the evil within us; we allow God to unleash the potential for pardon and love that lies within us; we agree to conform to his image. Confession is much easier than a psychoanalytic session, and much more ambitious in scope. To confess our sins is to encounter, in very concrete fashion, the unity of the two commandments; it is asking God to forgive us *as we forgive others.*

The upward directed search for a unifying Word and a unifying presence bears fruit in a downward directed communion. This communion is inalienable because it comes from Another in whom "there is no change".

IV

SYMBOLS

So far we have discussed the individual's struggle with his self-image and his relationship with others. Now we must examine the difficult process of integrating the world of external objects

into the picture. In our internal dialogue, they can create conflict and difficulty as we try to formulate a total picture.

Elsewhere we have discussed this topic at length, and we have talked about the "revenge of symbols". Here we find the same process that we have already described in connection with individual limits and the problem posed by others. Here again the sacraments offer us an alternative in which everything that "is" preserves its proper meaning, while at the same time cooperating in the unification of our own existence. Reflection on Christian symbols as they are presented in the sacraments seems to be the major issue in the fine works of G. Durand and P. Ricoeur.[17]

The sacraments force us to analyze how the integrative power of a symbol is both safeguarded and surpassed. Art, for example, utilizes the sensible to bring us to something beyond without ever leaving the sensible realm. By contrast, the sacraments utilize the sensible to integrate us with a life and a Person that is no longer of the sensible order alone.

If we refuse to accept this chance to move beyond the sensible, we lose the opportunity to integrate the multiplicity we experience in the universe, and, at the same time, we distort and mutilate the symbols themselves. This refusal of integration leads to all sorts of surrealist nightmares, as we well know. To live in fidelity to the incarnate presence of Christ, as it is presented to us in the sacraments, provides no little help in giving us composure as we confront the sensible itself.

Man cannot help but encounter his limits. Man cannot evade the Oedipus complex. Man cannot escape the invasion of the sensible. The anthropological course, which alone can reveal the real substructures of sacramental life, is composed of successive fears that every individual must conquer. And the fear of fragmentation is the most costly to recognize.

[17] G. Durand, *Les structures anthropologiques de l'imaginaire* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1963); P. Ricoeur, *De l'interprétation: Essai sur Freud, op. cit.;* see also, B. Bro, *op. cit.,* "Les symboles et leur revanche"; "Pouvons-nous passer des symboles?"; "Des symboles religieux"; "Le Christ et les symboles"; "Foi et sacrements"; pp. 167–246, and detailed bibliography on pp. 420–28.

Contemporary theology and pastoral practice should pay close attention to all the social sciences, the sciences of man. They will keep us from spouting purely *a priori* principles, from organizing projects that do not take account of what man has learned about himself. Theology and pastoral practice have an incredible opportunity to learn that our contemporaries have shown greater insight into our human condition: our wounded state, our quest for a state of wholeness.

To be sure, modern views of man are often dominated by atheism or the rejection of religious solutions to these questions. Undoubtedly they often cast aside the yoke of faith for a freedom that could be the most seductive Trojan horse of all for a created spirit. It is for us to show that sacramental truth is liberative, so long as we respect the dialectic between man's tainted self and this Other. Only this Other can insure our unity, because in him there is no blemish or obstacle or limit.

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The Church as Sacrament of the World

One of the most striking and generally acceptable consequences of Vatican Council II has been that the Catholic Church has become more conscious of the fact that God intended Christ's Church to serve the whole of mankind, i.e., the whole world. The mentality with which the Church, up till quite close to the Council, used to confess and to live that salvation revealed in Christ which it confesses and lives consciously and explicitly, though imperfectly and precariously, has broadened out considerably. It has come to see more clearly how all-embracing divine salvation has been from the beginning of human history, even when there was not yet, strictly speaking, a Church, a community of believers gathered on the basis of a special revelation. And so it has come to discover in the light of its faith traces of salvation in non-Christian peoples and cultures where the power of evil is contained in some saving way, and the search for the deepest meaning of life has not been wholly in vain.

The connection of creation and "re-creation", of world and Church, has become more clearly realized in the consciousness of its faith. This has been accompanied by a growing respect for the world and for human efforts toward the humanization of the world as important ingredients of the kingdom of God, but inevitably also by a relativization of the Church's significance dur-